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ON “POLITENESS” AND “POLITE LIES”  
IN EVERYDAY DISCOURSE
This article primarily contains a threefold presentation of the notion of politeness. The uni-
versality of the phenomenon of politeness and its wide recognisability inspired the choice of 
methodology adopted herein. The article aims to produce some observations with regard to both 
similarities and possible divergences amongst the following angles of the concept in question:
a) dictionary definitions,
b) definitions proposed by linguists, and
c) the perception of this concept by members of society.
The paper further aims to shape an initial vision of the category of “politeness” in order 
to classify it and specify its means of verbalization, with a special focus on the territory of 
polite lies. The article begins by presenting the dictionary definitions of the concept in que-
stion and attempts to show the complexity of the phenomenon, which directly results from the 
definitions under scrutiny. These are then contrasted with some common definitions proposed 
by linguists; the key concepts, the operationalization of politeness, and the author’s comments 
can be found in this section. Subsequently, these definitions are contrasted with the ways lay 
members of society perceive the concept of politeness. Afterwards, the paper briefly outlines 
the two fundamental theories of linguistic politeness, namely Brown and Levinson’s Theory 
of Politeness and Leechs’s Politeness Principle. This is done especially with a view to settling 
the notion of the polite lie within the frames of the aforementioned theories. Consequently, the 
phenomenon of the polite lie is defined and the ways in which it typically operates are shown. 
This is done by means of Brown and Levinson’s positive politeness theory and Leech’s maxims 
of politeness. Ultimately, the article attempts to contrast language users’ perceptions of polite 
lies with the two theories of politeness.
The dictionary database was collected from the OED2 dictionary and the Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary, as well as from two questionnaires presented to eight informants of different 
ages and occupations. 
The paper includes summing-up definitions of linguistic politeness and polite lies, as well 
as a table with the final results of the questionnaire studies. 
KEY WORDS: politeness, face, polite lies, discourse analysis.
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Towards a definition of politeness:  
a dictionary study
In order to arrive at an adequate definition of 
the term politeness (which is, undoubtedly, 
a difficult endeavour) one has to make a 
distinction between “politeness” which is 
seen as “polite behaviour in general” and 
politeness as “polite language use.” This 
natural dichotomy seems to be supported by 
the very dictionary definitions of the word 
in question, e.g.:
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED2 
on CD-ROM) gives the following defi-
nitions and diachronic usage of the word 
“politeness.”
1. lit. Polish, smoothness of surface. 
2. Mental or intellectual culture; polish, refi-
nement, elegance, good taste (of writings, authors, 
etc.). Now rare.
3. Polished manners, courtesy.
1702 Eng. Theophrast.  Politeness may be defined 
a dextrous management of our Words and Actions 
whereby we make other people have better Opinion 
of us and themselves.
1802 M. Edgeworth Moral T. (1816) I. vii. 45 
Real politeness only teaches us to save others from 
unnecessary pain.
1856 Emerson Eng. Traits, Aristocr. Wks. (Bohn) 
II. 83 Politeness is the ritual of society, as prayers 
are of the church.
The Merriam-Webster Online Dictiona-
ry provides the following definitions:
1  a : of, relating to, or having the characte-
ristics of advanced culture 
 b : marked by refined cultural interests and 
pursuits especially in arts and belles lettres
2  a : showing or characterized by correct 
social usage 
 b : marked by an appearance of considera-
tion, tact, deference, or courtesy 
 c : marked by a lack of roughness or cru-
dities <polite literature>
Thus, according to the above dictionary 
definitions, the perception of politeness 
appears to be at least threefold:
1) Behavioural dimension (polished man-
ners, dextrous management of words 
and actions)
2) Cultural dimension (the ritual of soci-
ety; marked by a lack of roughness or 
crudities)
3) Social dimension (saving others from 
unnecessary pain; showing or char-
acterized by correct social usage; an 
appearance of consideration, tact, defer-
ence, or courtesy)
The above-quoted dictionary definitions 
directly cast some light on the complexity 
and heterogeneity of this phenomenon. 
Let us narrow down the examination of 
the phenomenon to its linguistic dimension 
exclusively. Thus, so called “linguistic 
politeness” will be our main concern. As 
a matter of fact, to some people the term 
“linguistic politeness” appears tautologous, 
since most of the behaviour which is consi-
dered “polite” is rendered through language 
(Lakoff 2005). Seen from this perspective, 
there is very little “politeness” which can 
be described as “non-linguistic.”
Towards a definition of politeness: 
the linguists’ perspective
Now let us examine some of the perspecti-
ves that linguists adopt while talking about 
the phenomenon of linguistic politeness.
Watts (2003) approaches polite language 
usage from the following angle:
To characterise polite language usage, we might 
resort to expressions like “the language a person uses 
to avoid being too direct,” or “language which displays 
respect towards or consideration for others….” [W]
e might give examples such as “language which con-
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tains respectful forms of address like sir or madam,” 
“language that displays certain ‘polite’ formulaic 
utterances like please, thank you, excuse me or sor-
ry….” And again we would encounter people who 
consider the polite use of language as “hypocritical,” 
“dishonest,” “distant,” “unfeeling,” etc.
As can be seen from Watts’s definition, 
there is a certain amount of hesitancy and 
uncertainty in establishing this concept 
within a clear-cut frame. This seems to be 
due to the fact that the concept of politeness 
pervades various aspects of human activity, 
both verbal and non-. Its nature appears to 
be multi-layered, and heavily dependent on 
the pragmatic context of an utterance.
In the literature, there have been some 
other attempts to define politeness. Let me 
present and comment upon the most fun-
damental ones.
1. Lakoff (1975, p. 64): “…politeness is 
developed by societies in order to reduce 
friction in personal interaction.” Such 
friction is undesirable, and societies de-
velop strategies, politeness being one of 
them, to reduce that friction (Watts 2003).
2. Leech (1980, p. 19) defines it as “stra-
tegic conflict avoidance,” which “can 
be measured in terms of the degree of 
effort put into the avoidance of a conflict 
situation,” and the establishment and 
maintenance of comity. The avoidance 
of conflict is viewed as an intentional 
effort, as it is “strategic.” What is more, 
if politeness is behaviour whose aim is to 
establish and maintain comity, this must 
mean that people evaluate other forms of 
behaviour as undermining those aims.
3. Brown and Levinson (1978) “view po-
liteness as a complex system for soften-
ing face-threatening acts.”1
1  Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory will be 
discussed below. Face-threatening acts (FTAs) are acts 
4. Kasper (1990, p. 194) builds her work 
on Brown and Levinson’s approach 
to politeness and claims that “com-
munication is seen as a fundamentally 
dangerous and antagonistic endeavor.” 
“Politeness is therefore a term to refer 
to the strategies available to interactants 
to defuse the danger and to minimalise 
the antagonism” (Watts 2003, p. 51).
5. Hill et al. (1986, p. 349) characterize 
politeness as “one of the constraints on 
human interaction, whose purpose is 
to consider others’ feelings, establish 
levels of mutual comfort, and promote 
rapport.”
6. Ide (1989, p. 225) sees it as “language 
usage associated with smooth com-
munication.” As Sifianou (1992, pp. 
82–3) puts it, this “is achieved through 
the speaker’s use of intentional strate-
gies and of expressions conforming to 
prescribed norms.”
7. Sifianou (1992, p. 86) defines it as “the 
set of social values which instructs 
interactants to consider each other by 
satisfying shared expectations.” This 
definition seems to be normative and 
prescriptive in nature, as the idea of 
harmony in interaction and the idea of 
instructing language users are prevalent.
The above definitions can be summari-
zed in Tables 1–3.
either verbal or non-verbal, which threaten “the way in 
which an individual sees her/himself or would like to be 
seen by others (taken from the metaphorical expression 
‘face’, as in ‘to lose face,’ ‘face-saving,’ etc.)” (Watts 
2003, p. 274).
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Table 1. Summary of linguists’ definitions of politeness.
No. Source Key concepts Comments Operationaliza-tion of politeness
1. Lakoff (1975)
friction reduction in 
personal interaction
politeness is viewed as a set 
of norms for cooperative 
behaviour;
certain types of behaviour are 
socially undesirable
Behavioural,
evaluative
2. Leech (1980)
avoidance of a conflict 
situation;
maintenance of comity
some forms of behaviour 
threaten comity and those 
should be avoided strategically
Behavioural 
(strategic), 
attitudinal
3.
Brown 
and 
Levinson 
(1978)
softening face-
threatening acts
the notion of the hearer’s 
“face” is emphasized
Behavioural, 
attitudinal
4.
Kasper 
(1990)
fundamentally 
dangerous and 
antagonistic endeavour,
defusing danger 
and minimalizing 
antagonism
Brown and Levinson’s negative 
politeness is emphasized
Behavioural, 
attitudinal
5. Hill et al. (1986)
consideration for 
others’ feelings
establishing levels of 
mutual comfort and
promoting rapport
the notion of positive 
politeness is emphasized
Behavioural, 
attitudinal
6. Ide (1989)
smooth communication
conforming to 
prescribed  norms
politeness is normative
Behavioural, 
attitudinal
7. Sifianou (1992)
social values
consideration for each 
other
politeness is normative Evaluative
Table 2. Approaches to politeness
Categories Lakoff Leech Brown and Levinson Kasper
social dimension
politeness is 
developed by 
society
some forms of 
behaviour threaten 
comity and should 
be avoided
the notion of the 
hearer’s “face” is 
emphasized
-
interpersonal 
level
reduces friction 
in personal 
interaction
-
softening of 
face-threatening 
acts (Negative 
Politeness)
softening of 
face-threatening 
acts (Negative 
Politeness)
strategic 
behaviour
-
strategic conflict 
avoidance, 
intentional effort
complex system
strategic behaviour 
to minimize 
antagonism 
between 
interactants
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Table 3. Approaches to politeness (cont’d)
Categories Hill et al. Ide Sifianou
social dimension
mutual comfort and 
rapport (Positive 
Politeness)
smooth communication
pursuing shared 
expectations
interpersonal level consideration for 
others’ feelings
smooth communication consideration for others
strategic behaviour one of the constraints 
on human interaction
intentional strategies 
conforming to 
prescribed norms
set of social values
Towards a definition of politeness: 
as viewed by language users
For some linguists, an investigation of the 
ways in which polite or impolite behaviour 
is evaluated and commented upon by lay 
members of a social group is “the only va-
lid means of developing a social theory of 
politeness” (Watts 2003, p. 9). Indeed, the 
conceptualisation of this term by language 
users may constitute some solid ground 
for the presentation of what some people 
call Politeness Theory, that is, a theoretical 
concept of our polite (or impolite) linguistic 
behaviour. Hence, the methodology which 
has been employed in this paper.
For this reason, I thought it useful to 
have a rough idea of what polite or impolite 
behaviour denotes in our society. What is 
more, I was truly curious about the way 
people around me perceive this social phe-
nomenon. I intended to discover whether it 
is true or not that “lay conceptualisations 
of politeness are frequently rather vague, 
since we tend to take forms of politeness 
for granted” (Watts 2003, p. 30). On the 
other hand, I anticipated that speakers 
can tell intuitively whether an utterance is 
polite, rude, or in between, so I expected 
them to bring their intuitive rule-governed 
politeness competence2 into consciousness 
2  Lakoff (2006, p. 9) argues that the system of po-
liteness is systematically rule-governed. 
and present their understanding of this 
phenomenon. 
Hence, a simple questionnaire was con-
structed in which my informants were asked 
the following question:
What does the word “politeness” 
mean to you?
The data gathered are presented in 
Table 4.
As can be seen from the above lay defini-
tions, there exists a certain amount of over-
lap between those definitions and the ones 
proposed by the linguists studying the field. 
Let us compare the two types of defini-
tions in Table 5.
Interestingly, mutual comfort and pro-
motion of rapport in the linguists’ definition 
can be matched with kindness, well-bred 
manners and tactful behaviour in the infor-
mants’ definitions. Similarly, consideration 
for others has its rough counterpart in the 
form of respect towards others. The notion 
of a situational context is prevalent in both 
categories of the definitions.
Sifianou (1992) conducted a similar 
experiment among the English and Greek 
members of society. Her observations of 
the English conceptualization of the word 
politeness included: consideration for 
others, formality, discrete maintenance of 
distance, but also expressions of “altruism, 
generosity, morality and self-abnegation” 
(Sifianou 1992, p. 88).
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A polite lie and its definition
Not only politeness itself, but also the terri-
tory of a lie are within my field of attention 
and study. In this part of the paper I will 
attempt to examine some areas of linguistic 
behaviour in which a lie fulfils the criteria of 
“polite linguistic behaviour,” and therefore 
can be referred to as a polite lie. 
At the very onset, I will very briefly 
present the two fundamental theories of poli-
teness, namely Brown and Levinson’s Theory 
of Politeness and Leech’s Politeness Principle. 
Subsequently, I will illustrate how the notion 
of a lie operates within these two theories.
One of the crucial concepts in poli-
teness theory is the idea of face. Its sense 
Table 5. Comparison of linguists’ and lay speakers’ definitions of politeness.
LINGUISTS’ DEFINITION SPEAKERS’ DEFINITION
social dimension mutual comfort and promotion of 
rapport
kindness, well-bred manners, tactful 
behaviour
interpersonal level consideration for others’ feelings respect towards others; ability to 
understand others
strategic behaviour
intentional strategies conforming to 
prescribed norms;
set of social values
expressions which agree with spe-
cific situations or people
Table 4. Summary of lay responses to the politeness survey.
The perception of politeness by male polish informants of different ages and occupations.
No.1 No.2 No.3 No.4
Informant’s 
occupation
school manager regular soldier teacher of biology porter/janitor
Showing respect 
towards others. 
Ability to listen to 
and understand 
others. It can 
make life easier.
Behaving towards 
other people in a 
cultured way.
Ability to behave properly 
(i.e., in a way which is not 
troublesome to anybody or 
hurting anybody’s feelings, 
habits or traditions) in any 
situation, including unex-
pected ones.
Respect for other 
people and also a 
sign of our good 
manners and kind-
ness.
The perception of politeness  by female polish informants of different ages and occupations
No.1 No.2 No.3 No.4
Informant’s 
occupation
client consultant teacher of Russian consultant teacher of arts
Kindness; one’s 
ability to do 
somebody a fa-
vour if needed.
A particular kind 
of interpersonal 
behaviour charac-
terized by using 
words and expres-
sions which agree 
with specific situ-
ations or people.
Kindliness, being nice, a smile 
on one’s face, well-bred man-
ners, tactful behaviour in a 
particular situation.
A well-bred 
gesture towards 
another person.
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is closely related to the common phrase 
to lose face meaning “to be humiliated” 
or “to lose credit/reputation.”3 Brown and 
Levinson (1987) claim that every human 
being possesses “face,” something that is 
threatened in most encounters. They say 
that face exists in two varieties: positive 
face and negative face. 
A person’s positive face is “a person’s 
desire to be well thought of,” accepted and 
understood by others, even liked, treated as 
a friend and confidant, as a member of the 
same group, to be appreciated and appro-
ved of. Positive face involves the need to 
be connected. Thus, a complaint about the 
quality of someone’s work threatens his/her 
positive face. 
A person’s negative face can be defined 
as “a wish not to be imposed on by others 
and be allowed to go about our business 
unimpeded with our rights to free and 
self-determined action” (Grundy 1995, 
p. 133). Negative face involves the need 
to be independent. In other words, it can 
be viewed as freedom from imposition and 
freedom of action. 
An utterance may by oriented either to 
the positive or to the negative face of the 
interactants. Hence, one can distinguish 
so-called face-threatening acts, which are 
those acts that endanger the hearer’s ne-
gative face, since they frequently impose 
some action on the hearer, intrude on the 
addressee’s territory, and limit his or her 
freedom of action (Sifianou 1992). On the 
other hand, an example of reference (and 
threat) to the addressee’s positive face can 
be our dissatisfaction with the quality of 
their service or work. 
3  According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary. 
What Brown and Levinson (1987) call 
positive politeness and negative politeness 
is an action of redress (an indication that no 
“face threat is intended or desired” (ibid, p. 
70)) which is oriented either to the hearer’s 
positive or negative face respectively. What 
is more, they formulate superordinate stra-
tegies from which we can choose when we 
have a face-threatening act to perform: 
1. To do the act on-record (explicitly, 
without attempting to hide what we are 
conveying).
The on-record strategy can be further 
subdivided into three subordinate stra-
tegies: 
a. to do the act on-record baldly 
without redress
b. to do the act on-record with positive 
politeness
c. to do the act on-record with nega-
tive politeness
2. To do the act off-record (implicitly, 
attempting to hide what we are con-
veying). 
3. Not to do the act at all. 
Which strategy we choose is a question 
of how polite we wish to be. The strategies 
presented above rank from the least polite 
(1), in which there is no compensation 
for the face-threat, to (3) where “the face 
threat is too great to be compensated for 
by any language formula so that the most 
appropriate politeness strategy is not to do 
the act” (Grundy 1995, p. 135). 
How does a verbal lie function within 
Brown and Levinson’s Theory of Poli-
teness? I deliberately avoided using the term 
act since a lie cannot be treated as a speech 
act in the sense Austin (1965) understood it. 
Let me, by way of digression, explain 
the “non-performative” nature of a lie. A 
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lie does not possess any direct (explicit) or 
indirect (implicit) formula that would be 
capable of rendering such an act. Drawing 
on Austin’s Speech Act Theory, a lie is not 
a performative act of the following form:
I hereby + Vgp
We cannot say:  I hereby lie to you. Si-
milarly, we cannot say I hereby threaten 
you. As Sebeok (1978, p. 126) phrased it: 
“Nothing is a lie in itself , but any utterance 
can be a lie.”
Lies and Positive Politeness 
To Brown and Levinson, a lie operates wi-
thin the Theory of Politeness in the latter’s 
positive domain (Positive Politeness) exclu-
sively. The need to be polite frequently leads 
us to resort to the strategy of lying, parti-
cularly when there is a risk of threatening 
our own or the interlocutor’s positive face. 
Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 115) treat 
“white lies” as examples of positive poli-
teness, that is, a strategy that we frequently 
employ when we wish to avoid threatening 
the hearer’s positive face. White lies can 
be treated as conventional, habitual and 
automatically fabricated excuses exploited 
in situations involving an awkward request 
or an awkward question (Antas 2008). False 
excuses are, thus, a fairly common strategy 
within a polite lie, e.g.:
I can’t lend you my iPod as the batteries 
are run-down.
I’d love to go out with you tonight, but 
I have to stay longer at work.
Leech’s Politeness Principle
Leech (1983) puts forward his own theory 
of politeness, chiefly by introducing the 
Politeness Principle which maintains “the 
social equilibrium and the friendly relations 
which enable us to assure that our interlocu-
tors are being cooperative in the first place” 
(1983, p. 82). The Principle works in two 
ways: it can “minimize (other things being 
equal) the expression of impolite beliefs,” 
which is its negative form. In its positive 
form it can “maximize (other things being 
equal) the expression of polite beliefs.” Po-
lite and impolite beliefs are the ones which 
are favourable or unfavourable to the hearer.
• TACT MAXIM
a) Minimize cost to other 
b) (Maximize benefit to other)
Leech considers the Tact Maxim as “per-
haps the most important kind of politeness 
in English-speaking society.”
There are two sides to the Tact Maxim: 
a negative one (a), and a positive one (b), 
the second being less important, but still “a 
natural corollary of the first.” 
The degree of tact can be measured by 
means of the cost-benefit scale. It estima-
tes the cost or benefit to the speaker or to the 
hearer of a certain action A. Leech (1983, 
p. 107) gives the following example:
1. Peel these potatoes. cost to hearer less polite
2. Hand me the newspaper.
3. Sit down.
4. Look at that.
5. Enjoy your holiday.
6. Have another sandwich. benefit to hearer more polite
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Antas (2008) considers a lie to be a 
tactful, desirable and strategic behaviour in 
a particular pragmatic situation. Utterances 
like Enjoy your holiday or Have another 
sandwich can be examples of lies with the 
speaker not necessarily genuinely meaning 
what he or she conveys, instead simply 
obeying the Tact Maxim.
• GENEROSITY MAXIM
a) Minimize benefit to self
b) (Maximize cost to self)
For example, when we consider the 
following sentences: Could I have some 
more X? and Is there any more X?, Leech 
notices that greater politeness is achieved 
in the second one, because reference to the 
speaker as beneficiary is omitted (minimi-
zation of benefit to self).
We very often employ this strategy while 
producing conventional false assurances of 
the following sort:
Doesn’t really matter. (Pol.: nie ma 
sprawy) 
That’s OK. (Pol.: nic się nie stało) 
No problem. (Pol.: to nic)
Clearly, in the above examples the 
speaker is “generous” towards the hearer 
in order to save his/her positive face in an 
awkward situation.
Let us consider two more examples:
I can lend you my car, no problem. (cost 
to self)
You must come and visit us. (cost to self)
In these examples the speaker (whether 
genuinely or not) commits to performing 
some action which could imply benefit to 
the hearer and cost to the speaker.
• APPROBATION MAXIM 
a)  Minimize dispraise of other
b)  (Maximize praise of other)
“In its more important negative aspect, 
this maxim says ‘avoid saying unpleasant 
things about others, and more particularly, 
about h’” (1983, p. 135). Leech exemplifies: 
the compliment What a wonderful meal you 
cooked! is highly valued, whereas What an 
awful meal you cooked! is not. As dispraise 
of h or of a third party is impolite, various 
strategies of indirectness can be applied to 
diminish the effect of criticism, for instance 
“institutionalized forms of understatement” 
or, as Leech puts it, lack of praise which 
implicates dispraise:
You could be more careful.
Her performance was not as good as it 
might have been.
A: Do you like these plums? B: I’ve 
tasted better.
Interestingly, Leech initially suggests, 
but eventually abandons, as he puts it, an 
unflattering subtitle for the Approbation 
Maxim, namely “the Flattery Maxim.” He 
observes that “the term ‘flattery’ is generally 
reserved for insincere approbation” (1983, 
p. 135). Here we encounter the word insin-
cere, which is vital for our understanding of 
the polite lie strategy operating within this 
maxim. We do, in fact, often praise others in 
a hyperbolic way or alternatively use litotes 
or understatement in order to minimize 
our dispraise of others.  Let us consider the 
following examples:
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I’m very happy to see you!
hyperboleThat’s a great present!
I’m infinitely grateful!
It’s not quite like that.
litotes/understatementYou could have been more thoughtful.
Your work leaves a lot to be desired.
• MODESTY MAXIM
a)  Minimize praise of self
b)  (Maximize dispraise of self)
Leech (1983) gives the following 
examples (the dagger † indicates that the 
utterance is less acceptable in terms of 
absolute politeness):
How stupid of me!     †How clever of me!
Please accept this small gift as a token 
of our esteem.
†Please accept this large gift as a token 
of our esteem.
The above examples show that self-
-dispraise is considered to be quite modest, 
even when exaggerated for some comic 
effect. Similarly, the understatement of 
one’s generosity or false disagreement is 
normal and conventional, in contrast to the 
exaggeration of one’s generosity. “To break 
the first submaxim of Modesty is to commit 
the social transgression of boasting” (1983, 
p. 136). Hence, we often resort to lying and 
produce utterances of the following kind:
My contribution was really small. (in 
fact it wasn’t, mine was the lion’s share)
No, you’re exaggerating. (false disa-
greement)
In my humble opinion…
If I could say something…
• AGREEMENT MAXIM
a) Minimize disagreement between 
self and other
b) (Maximize agreement between self 
and other)
Leech notes that “there is a tendency to 
exaggerate agreement with other people, 
and to mitigate disagreement by expressing 
regret, partial agreement, etc.” (1983, p. 
138). He gives the following examples:
A: It was an interesting exhibition, 
wasn’t it?
B: †No, it was very uninteresting. [Ma-
xim of Agreement disobeyed]
A: English is a difficult language to 
learn.
B: True, but the grammar is quite easy.
The latter example shows that partial 
disagreement is more preferable to complete 
disagreement.
Some more examples of conventional 
lies include:
It’s not quite like that. (Pol.: To niezu-
pełnie tak.)
I don’t fully agree. (Pol.: Nie całkiem 
się zgadzam)
It doesn’t suit me very well. (Pol.: Nie 
bardzo mi to odpowiada) – in the case when 
we completely disagree with something.
I’ll have to consider this. (Pol.: Muszę 
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się jeszcze nad tym zastanowić) – in the 
case when we know that something does 
not satisfy us.
• SYMPATHY MAXIM
a) Minimize antipathy between self 
and other
b) (Maximize sympathy between self 
and other)
This maxim “explains why congratula-
tions and condolences are courteous speech 
acts, even though… [they] express beliefs 
which are negative with regard to the he-
arer” (1983, p. 138). Example:
I’m terribly sorry to hear that your dog 
died.
in contrast to: †I’m terribly pleased to 
hear that your dog died.
Leech (1983) points out that condo-
lences are usually expressed with some 
reticence since they convey an impolite 
belief which is unfavourable to h. Therefore 
it might be preferable to say:
I’m terribly sorry to hear about your 
dog.
The power of the Sympathy Maxim 
enables the hearer to interpret the above 
utterances as an expression of sympathy 
for misfortune.
Antas (2008) produces her own additio-
nal maxim to Leech’s maxims, which she 
labels as Maksyma Wspólnego Narzekania 
(Maxim of Shared Complaining [translation 
mine]). The application of this maxim is 
prevalent among Polish language users. She 
regards complaining as a typically Polish 
verbal behaviour employed in a particular 
situation that can be fortunate or not for 
the speaker. She compares this strategy to 
“picking holes in something” and finally 
treats it as a derivative of Leech’s Modesty 
Maxim. 
I think everyone is familiar with typical-
ly Polish responses to the question How’s 
life? We are likely to say: 
Pol.: Stara bieda. ≈ En: Same as ever. 
Pol.: Jakoś leci. ≈ En: Can’t complain. 
Adhering to Leech’s Modesty Maxim 
and seeking positive politeness between us 
and the third party is the main incentive for 
employing this strategy.
Polite lies from the perspective of 
language users
Curiosity as to how language users 
understand the phenomenon of polite lies 
inspired me to conduct yet another question-
naire. I asked my informants the following 
question:
What does “a polite lie” mean to you?
The answers are presented in Table 6.
It seems to me that for both male and fe-
male informants, the most important under-
lying reason for employing the strategy of a 
polite lie is his or her interlocutor’s positive 
face. Indeed, Brown and Levinson’s posi-
tive face notion seems to be prevailing in all 
the answers given. Consider the following: 
•	 he/she avoids hurting the addressee of 
the message
•	 in order not to hurt them
•	 avoidance of embarrassing situations in 
interpersonal relations
•	 one can avoid a clumsy situation or 
hurting somebody
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•	 not to undermine social relations
•	 convey unpleasant information more 
subtly
Conclusions
To sum up, the primary purpose of this 
paper was to present, compare and contrast 
the notion of politeness from a threefold 
perspective: 
•	 the dictionary definitions
Table 6. Lay speakers’ understanding of “polite lies.”
The perception of politeness by male polish informants of different ages and occupations
No.1 No.2 No.3 No.4
Informant’s 
occupation
school manager regular
soldier
teacher of biology porter/janitor
The least harmful of  
all lies, frequently 
resulting in the better 
mental state of the 
“perpetrator” as he/
she avoids hurting 
the addressee of the 
message.
Saying something 
which is not true to 
somebody in order not 
to hurt them.
Concealment of 
something  or a 
harmless lie over an 
unimportant matter, 
thanks to which one 
can avoid a clumsy 
situation or hurting 
somebody.
The choice of 
a “lesser evil;” 
a sign of our 
kindness and 
reluctance 
to distress 
others.
The perception of politeness  by female polish informants of different ages and occupations
No.1 No.2 No.3 No.4
Informant’s 
 occupation
client consultant teacher of Russian consultant teacher of arts
It is like saying to 
somebody: “You look 
nice today,” without 
really meaning it.
Avoidance of embar-
rassing situations in 
interpersonal rela-
tions. A situation in 
which it is more advis-
able to say an untruth 
or a half-truth in order 
not to undermine 
social relations.
A lie for somebody’s 
own good;
concealment of 
truth/ understate-
ment in order to 
convey unpleasant 
information more 
subtly.
It is a way 
of saving 
somebody (our 
interlocutor) 
from distress, 
sadness, etc.
•	 linguists’ descriptions
•	 language users’ conceptualizations
What is more, I have attempted to lo-
cate the concept of a polite lie within the 
two fundamental theories of “politeness,” 
i.e., Brown and Levinson’s Theory of Poli-
teness and Leech’s Politeness Principle. In 
addition, I have endeavoured to contrast the 
perception of polite lies by language users 
with the two theories mentioned above.
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DZIENNYM DYSKURSIE
Streszczenie
Niniejszy artykuł ukazuje zjawisko grzeczności 
językowej z trzech perspektyw: definicji słow-
nikowych, definicji zaproponowanych przez 
językoznawców oraz sposobów pojmowania tego 
zjawiska przez użytkowników języka. Podstawo-
wym celem artykułu było ukazanie zbieżności i 
różnic występujących pomiędzy wyżej wymienio-
nymi sposobami definiowania tego zjawiska, jak 
również określenie jego występowania w obszarze 
kłamstwa grzecznościowego. Przedstawiono defi-
nicje słownikowe grzeczności i ukazano złożoność 
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ŠIS TAS APIE „MANDAGUMĄ“ IR „MAN-
DAGŲ MELĄ“ KASDIENIAME DISKURSE
Santrauka
Straipsnyje kalbama apie trejopą mandagumo 
sąvoką. Šio straipsnio metodologijos pasirinkimą 
lėmė mandagumo reiškinio universalumas ir jo 
platus pripažinimas. Straipsnyje siekiama pateikti 
keletą pastebėjimų apie panašumus ir galimus 
skirtumus, kurie atsiranda nagrinėjant sąvokas šiais 
aspektais: žodyno apibrėžimų, kalbininkų siūlomų 
apibrėžimų, visuomenės narių supratimas. Be to, 
siekiama suformuluoti pradinę „mandagumo“ 
kategorijos viziją, kad būtų galima ją klasifikuoti 
ir detalizuoti jos verbalizavimą kreipiant ypatingą 
dėmesį mandagiam melui. Straipsnio pradžioje 
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tego zjawiska. Następnie przedstawiono główne 
definicje zjawiska grzeczności, zaproponowane 
przez językoznawców. Omówiono także kluczowe 
pojęcia i obszary występowania zjawiska grzeczno-
ści, dodano komentarze autorskie. Następnie doko-
nano analizy porównawczej definicji uzyskanych 
od użytkowników języka i skontrastowano je z 
definicjami podanymi przez badaczy języka. W dal-
szej części artykułu pokrótce scharakteryzowano 
dwie fundamentalne teorie dotyczące grzeczności 
językowej: teorię grzeczności Penelope Brown 
i Stephena Levinsona oraz zasadę grzeczności 
Geoffreya Leecha. Dokonano próby osadzenia 
zjawiska kłamstwa grzecznościowego w ramach 
wyżej wymienionych teorii. Pomocne okazały 
się kategorie grzeczności pozytywnej, jak też Le-
echowskie maksymy grzeczności. W zakończeniu 
autor skonfrontował sposób postrzegania zjawiska 
kłamstwa grzecznościowego przez użytkowników 
języka z teoriami grzeczności zaproponowanymi 
przez Brown i Levinsona oraz Leecha.
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: grzeczność, grzeczność 
językowa, twarz, kłamstwo grzecznościowe, ana-
liza dyskursu.
pateikiama sąvokos definicija, aptariamas reiškinio 
sudėtingumas, pastebėtas kruopščiai išanalizavus 
sąvokos apibrėžimus. Toliau pristatomi bendrieji 
lingvistų apibrėžimai ir gretinamoji analizė. Pa-
teikiamos pagrindinės mandagumo ir autoriaus 
komentarų sąvokos. Vėliau šie apibrėžimai lygi-
nami su visuomenės narių mandagumo sąvokos 
supratimo būdais. 
Siekiant tiksliai apibrėžti mandagaus melo 
sąvoką, straipsnyje trumpai apibūdinamos dvi 
fundamentalios lingvistinio mandagumo teorijos. 
Pasitelkus Browno ir Levinsono teigiamo manda-
gumo teoriją bei Leecho mandagumo maksimas, 
apibrėžiamas mandagaus melo reiškinys, parodo-
mi jo veikos būdai. Stengiamasi palyginti kalbos 
vartotojų mandagaus melo suvokimą su dviem 
mandagumo teorijomis.
Žodyno duomenų bazė buvo surinkta iš OED2 
žodyno, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, taip 
pat dviejų klausimynų, pateiktų aštuoniems įvai-
raus amžiaus ir profesijų informantams.
REIKŠMINIAI ŽODŽIAI: mandagumas, vei-
das, mandagus melas, diskurso analizė.
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